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TURNING MIRANDA RIGHT SIDE UP: POST-
WAIVER INVOCATIONS AND THE NEED TO
UPDATE THE MIRANDA WARNINGS
Joshua L Hammack*
INTRODUCTION
In Miranda v. Arizona,' the Supreme Court sought to protect the
constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.2 It did
so by, among other things, requiring that interrogators inform sus-
pects of the right to remain silent before conducting a custodial inter-
rogation. 3 In the forty-five years since Miranda was decided, the right
to remain silent has been frequently litigated, creating a body of law
that is difficult to understand, often unfair to criminal suspects seek-
ing to invoke the right,4 and largely contrary to the Miranda Court's
intention.5 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Berghuis v.
* Juris Doctor Candidate 2012. I would like to thank Professor Richard W.
Garnett for graciously assisting in the development of this Note; Heather LaDue for
listening to countless hypotheticals regarding warnings, waivers, and invocations, and
even reading drafts of this Note, without kicking me to the curb; Spencer Durland for
reviewing drafts and generously sharing his thoughts and suggesting additions; and
Emily Martin for her editing wizardry.
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 See id. at 457.
3 See id. at 479.
4 See infra Part II. For example, because the Court's unambiguous invocation
requirement disavows any assessment of the suspect's intent, those who use colloquial
language and, more troublingly, those who are scared or feel powerless will often not
be held to have invoked their rights. See Sandra Guerra Thompson, Evading Miranda:
How Seibert and Patane Failed to "Save" Miranda, 40 VAL. U. L. Riv. 645, 664 (2006).
Moreover, groups that have historically been powerless in society-including women
and ethnic minorities-are "far more likely than others to adopt indirect speech pat-
terns" and "attempt to invoke their rights by using speech patterns that the law refuses
to recognize." Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness
in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 261 (1993).
5 Compare Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2261 (2010) (stating that the
"main purpose of Miranda is to ensure that an accused is advised of and understands
the right to remain silent and the right to counsel"), with Charles J. Ogletree, Are
Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARv. L. REV.
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Thompkins6 compounds these concerns in two ways. First, although
the Court placed a new and demanding requirement on invocations
of the right to remain silent,7 the Court did not require officers to
inform suspects of that requirement. Second, despite Miranda's
"implicit promise,"8 suspects' post-waiver silence in custodial interro-
gations can be used against them at trial.9 In Berghuis, the Court held
that such silence is not an invocation of the right because it is not
"unambiguous."10 To remedy the current warnings' failures, 1 the
Court could reexamine this stance on silence, reconsider the use of
clarifying questions, or provide a more robust right to counsel in cus-
todial interrogations. More directly, it could update the Miranda
warnings so that they accurately reflect its precedents and inform sus-
pects of the requirements placed on invocations. What is clear is that
something must change to ensure that the "transcendent right"12
Miranda sought to protect is actually-and adequately-protected.
Before proceeding to the analysis and argument, a few words
about terminology may prove useful. Two terms in particular are of
great importance and deserve express definition: exercise and invoca-
tion. As used throughout this Note, the "exercise" of the right to
remain silent includes any time that a criminal suspect may simply
remain silent without having that silence used against him. For pur-
poses of this Note, there are just two such circumstances: Post-warning
1826, 1827-28 (1987) ("Although police invariably give Miranda warnings before
interrogating suspects, this process has not succeeded in ensuring that suspects fully
understand either their right to remain silent or the consequences of their statements
to police.... Miranda warnings as currently delivered by the police are not an effec-
tive means of informing suspects both of the existence and extent of their privilege
against self-incrimination and of their right to consult with counsel before they make
any statements.").
6 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
7 See id. at 2260 (requiring that invocations of the right to remain silent be
unambiguous).
8 See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) ("[W]hile it is true that the
Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty,
such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings.").
9 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Womack, 929 N.E.2d 943, 952 (Mass. 2010) (hold-
ing that the convicted defendant's silence in response to the interrogator's question
regarding his reason for standing outside a store before the crime was committed
"was not an exercise of his right to remain silent, but a failure to respond to a particu-
lar question" and was thus "admissible in evidence . . . and subject to comment")
(citations omitted).
10 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 (2010).
11 See infra Part II.
12 Marcy Strauss, The Sounds of Silence: Reconsidering the Invocation of the Right to
Remain Silent Under Miranda, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 773, 817 (2009).
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but pre-waiver silence and post-invocation silence. Regarding the for-
mer instance of silence, the suspect may remain silent-and prosecu-
tors cannot use such silence in court-because the suspect has not yet
waived his right to do so. Regarding the latter instance, a suspect may,
at any time, "invoke" his right to remain silent.13 A valid invocation is
an affirmative and unambiguous statement of the desire to use the
right1 4 and differs from an "exercise" in one important respect-
namely, an "invocation" requires that police end the interrogation.1 5
Because of this requirement, no post-invocation silence can be used at
trial.16 Further, the fact of an invocation itself cannot be used against
the suspect.1 7 Under this scheme, to be sure that his post-waiver
silence is not used against him, the suspect must "invoke" his right to
remain silent.
To demonstrate the inadequacy of the current warnings, this
Note uses the facts presented in Berghuis v. Thompkins, often with sub-
tle variations. In that case, police suspected that Van Chester
Thompkins, Jr. was involved in a shooting that left one man dead and
another injured.'8 A year after the shooting, Thompkins was arrested
and taken in for questioning.19 He received the Miranda warnings but
refused to sign a form stating that he understood them.20  Still,
officers began interrogating him.2 1 For two hours and forty-five min-
utes, Thompkins remained "almost completely silent" in the face of
continuous police questioning.22 Finally, the following exchange
occurred:
Detective: Do you believe in God?
13 See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2262.
14 See id. at 2260; infra Part I.C.
15 This requirement holds true regardless of when the suspect invokes (i.e., pre-
or post-waiver). See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 (stating that both the right to remain
silent and the right to counsel protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against compul-
sory self-incrimination "by requiring an interrogation to cease when either right is
invoked"); see also Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975) ("The critical safe-
guard identified in the passage at issue is a person's 'right to cut off questioning.'")
(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)).
16 See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
17 See infra note 81 and accompanying text.




22 Id. at 2256-57 (claiming that Thompkins gave "limited verbal responses ...
such as 'yeah,' 'no,' or 'I don't know,'" communicated by nodding his head, and
stated that he "'didn't want a peppermint' . . . and that the chair he was 'sitting in was
hard"'); see also id. at 2267 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (adding that the officers char-
acterized the interrogation as "'very, very one-sided' and 'nearly a monologue'").
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Thompkins: Yes.
Detective: Do you pray to God?
Thompkins: Yes.
Detective: Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that
boy down?
Thompkins: Yes.23
Thompkins's affirmative answers gave police the incriminating
statement they sought. Those statements were presented at trial, and
Thompkins was convicted of murder, assault with intent to commit
murder, and other gun charges. 24
Part I uses these facts to explain the current system of warnings,
waivers, and invocations, and argues that the current process has
departed from Miranda's intention by failing to provide suspects a full
understanding of their rights. Part II demonstrates that the current
warnings are unfair, especially to suspects who have waived their
rights, because they provide no guidance regarding how to invoke
one's rights. Part III presents several alternative solutions to remedy
this unfairness and better protect suspects, ultimately concluding that
an amendment to the warnings is the simplest and most effective solu-
tion. Finally, Part IV demonstrates how new, more complete warnings
should look.
I. THE RIGHT To REMAIN SILENT
"[Olur accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government
seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its
own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient
of compelling it from his own mouth. "25
To fully appreciate how the current warnings fall short of
Miranda's noble goal, one must understand what prompted the warn-
ings in the first place. The warnings themselves constitute the "what"
of the decision, while the Court's reasoning forms the "why." Once
this information is established in subsection A, subsections B and C
address the Court's recent holdings regarding waivers and invoca-
tions, respectively. In light of these holdings, the warnings' content
no longer satisfies their purpose.
23 See id. at 2257 (majority opinion).
24 Id. at 2258.
25 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
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A. The Required Warnings and Their Purpose
The custodial interrogation atmosphere carries a "badge of intim-
idation ... destructive to human dignity"26 and "trades on the weak-
ness of individuals."2 7 For these reasons, the Miranda Court believed
that a criminal suspect had to receive "full warnings of constitutional
rights"2 8 to ensure that his statements were "truly the product of free
choice." 29 As such, the Court required police to provide four specific
warnings, prior to any questioning, to an individual in custody:
[T]hat he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can
be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires.30
These four warnings have become the "primary protection
afforded [to] suspects" in custodial interrogations. 3' Together, they
form the "what" of the Miranda Court's decision. Perhaps the more
important consideration, however, is the "why." A return to the "why"
of the Miranda decision is appropriate for two reasons: (1) if the warn-
ings have been rendered ineffective, their underlying purpose might
be grounds to update the warnings or otherwise alter our method of
protection, and (2) the warnings' justification emphasizes what they
protect-the "transcendent right"3 2 to remain silent. In short, the
warnings were meant to provide the foundational rules of custodial
interrogations and to ensure that suspects and interrogators would
operate on a "level playing field."33 The warnings serve these pur-
poses in a variety of ways.
First, the warnings protect suspects by serving an informative
function; they increase a suspect's awareness of his constitutional
rights. The Miranda Court formulated the warnings to "adequately and
effectively" apprise a suspect of his right to remain silent34 and to
26 Id. at 457.
27 Id. at 455.
28 Id. at 445 (emphasis added).
29 Id. at 457.
30 Id. at 479.
31 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994).
32 Strauss, supra note 12, at 817.
33 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. The warnings were indeed intended to be much
more than "catchy phrases for today's popular television shows." Roscoe C. Howard,
Jr. & Lisa A. Rich, A Hitory of Miranda and Why It Remains Vital Today, 40 VAL. U. L.
REv. 685, 685 (2006).
34 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (emphasis added).
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"assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it."35 Through this
apprisal and assurance, the warnings protect the suspect "from being
compelled to incriminate himself in any manner."3 6 Their recitation
"dispel [s] whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process"
by providing a suspect with a "full comprehension of the rights to remain
silent and request an attorney."37 Thus, the warnings' primary func-
tion is informative.38 The Miranda Court sought to combat coercion
specifically by increasing suspects' knowledge. Moreover, the Court
believed that this knowledge would empower suspects to exercise
their rights if they desired to do so.
Secondly, the Miranda warnings empower suspects to assert con-
trol in custodial interrogations by requiring the interrogator-the
more powerful party-to remind the suspect of the power he retains39
(i.e., the power to refuse to answer questions or to cut off questioning
once it has begun). The warnings are thus a verbal reminder-to
35 Id. at 444.
36 Id. at 476; see also George C. Thomas III, Laying Bare the Failure of Criminal
Procedure Doctrine, 4 CRIM. L.F. 535, 546 (1993) ("The promised practical benefit [of
Miranda] was to enable defendants to refuse to answer questions when that was what
they wanted to do.").
37 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986) (emphasis added). The Supreme
Court recently reiterated that the warnings' "main purpose ... is to ensure that an
accused is advised of and understands the right to remain silent and the right to coun-
sel." Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2261 (2010) (emphasis added).
38 See Mark A. Godsey, Refonnulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of Contemporary
Law and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REv. 781, 802 (2006) ("The two right to silence
warnings help to dissipate coercion by informing the suspect of [his] rights. The
warnings let [him] know that while it may appear that the interrogators hold all the
cards, [he] holds a trump card embossed with the power of the Fifth Amendment
.... Certainly, suspects today feel less pressure and are in a better position to control
their destinies in the stationhouse interrogation room than they would be without
knowing of their right to remain silent or of the consequences of speaking.").
39 "Miranda operates by exacting an exclusionary cost for noncompliance," and
"avoidance of that cost is the principal reason for police to follow the Miranda
requirements." Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda ?, 112 YALE L.J.
447, 551 (2002). The interrogator is thus free to ask questions without giving the
warnings if he so desires, but the suspect's unwarned statements cannot be used
against him in court. See id. at 475. It is, after all, "the use of compelled statements,
not their acquisition, that the [Fifth Amendment] prohibits." Id. Thus, at least inso-
far as the interrogator is seeking material that can be used against the suspect at trial,
he must first provide the warnings. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,
443-44 (2000) ("[U]nwarned statements may not be used as evidence in the prosecu-
tion's case in chief."); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 99-100 (1975) ("[U]nless law
enforcement officers give certain specified warnings before questioning a person in
custody,... any statement made by the person in custody cannot over his objection
be admitted in evidence against him as a defendant at trial, even though the state-
ment may in fact be wholly voluntary.").
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both suspects and interrogators-that constitutional rights are in play,
and that those rights cannot be ignored or trampled. 40 In this regard,
the warnings serve a dual function: they reassure the suspect that his
rights must be honored if he chooses to exercise them, and they
remind police that, no matter how much they believe they need a con-
fession, they may not obtain it by whatever means (i.e. they must at all
times operate within the bounds of the Constitution).
Finally, the warnings are significant for their effect on criminal
prosecutions. They effectively "increase the probability that a per-
son's response to police questioning will be intelligent and volun-
tary."41 Thus, the recitation of the warnings, when coupled with a
valid waiver of rights, "creates a presumption of voluntariness and
admissibility." 4 2 Quite simply, when a suspect is informed of and fully
understands his rights, his choice to answer questions may confidently
be called "voluntary"; any fear of coercion is allayed because the sus-
pect knew he had the power not to answer. 43 From this perspective,
the warnings are "intended to dispel enough compulsion to allow a
suspect to reflect on whether to talk or remain silent,"44 and to ensure
that whatever the suspect says may be used at his trial.4 5
40 See Howard & Rich, supra note 33, at 703.
41 Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 620-21 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42 See Godsey, supra note 38, at 790; see also Thomas, supra note 36, at 546-47
(1993) ("If the police follow the Miranda procedure, prosecutors can be almost
assured of the admissibility of the confession . . . .").
43 Professor Godsey has suggested that the Court has moved away from its "origi-
nal compulsion theory" and has instead used the warnings to determine the voluntari-
ness of a confession. See Godsey, supra note 38, at 810-11. This description may be
accurate. However, one cannot ignore the important connection between the Court's
willingness to assume that post-warning statements are voluntary and its belief that the
warnings have reduced the coercive power of interrogators by informing suspects of
their rights. In truth, the latter seems to have caused the former. In other words,
because the Court believes that the warnings are effective in informing suspects of
their constitutional rights and empowering them to exercise those rights, it assumes
that post-warning statements are voluntarily made. Professor Godsey highlights an
important consideration in the foregoing analysis: If the Court does believe the warn-
ings ensure that statements are voluntary, "a logical connection should exist between
the concept of voluntariness and the content of the warnings themselves." Id. at 812.
This concern resurfaces in Parts II.A.3, III.B, and IV.
44 John T. Parry, Constitutional Interpretation, Coercive Interrogation, and Civil Rights
Litigation After Chavez v. Martinez, 39 GA. L. REv. 733, 813 (2005).
45 Here, it is important to note what Miranda is not. It "is not designed to pro-
mote the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial ..... Thomas, supra note 36,
at 550. The truth or falsity of the confession is irrelevant. The important considera-
tion is only that the confession is uncoerced, uncompelled, and voluntary. Miranda is
thus "a protector of free choice." Id.
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In Berghuis, all parties agreed that Thompkins received the appro-
priate warnings.4 6 Before the interrogation, officers allowed him to
read a card with five warnings printed on it.47 After Thompkins read
the fifth warning aloud to prove that he could read and understand
English, officers read him the four warnings Miranda requires. 48
Clearly, the officers satisfied the "what" of Miranda; however, it
remains to be seen if the "what" still satisfies the "why."49
B. Valid Waivers and Why They Are Required
For a criminal defendant's statement during a custodial interro-
gation to be admissible at trial, the prosecution must demonstrate that
he "knowingly and voluntarily" waived his Miranda rights.50 For the
waiver to be "voluntary," it must be "the product of a free and deliber-
ate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception."5 1 For it
to be "knowing," the suspect must first have "a full awareness of both
the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it."52 In short, the suspect must have received
sufficient information to make an informed decision.53 Here, the
warnings' informative function is of paramount importance, as the
warnings convey what the Miranda Court believed to be "the mini-
mum information necessary to make these decisions"5 4 (i.e., to waive
and speak, simply remain silent, or invoke and end the interrogation).
A valid waiver need not be express; it can be implied by the cir-
cumstances.5 5 However, even an implied waiver must be both "volun-
46 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259 (2010).
47 Id. at 2256. The fifth warning informed Thompkins of his continuing "right to
decide . . . to use [his] right to remain silent" during the interrogation. Id.
48 Id.
49 That is precisely the question addressed in this Note-whether the warnings
adequately inform suspects of their constitutional right to remain silent, so that sus-
pects fully understand that right and can freely choose to waive, exercise, or invoke it.
For an explanation of why the current warnings fail in significant respects, see infra
Part II.
50 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2260.
51 Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)).
52 Id. (emphasis added).
53 See Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1519, 1563
(2008).
54 Id. at 1563-64. To drive home his point that the warnings provide the mini-
mum information necessary, Professor Weisselberg notes "that officers are not
required to provide additional information that might enable suspects to make a more
informed choice." Id. at 1564 (emphasis added). Thus, the warnings are "a mini-
mum though not necessarily sufficient condition for an informed decision." Id.
55 See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2261.
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tary" and "knowing."56 A court may presume that an individual has
made a "deliberate choice" sufficient to establish an implied waiver
where the prosecution shows that the Miranda warnings were given,
that the accused had a "full understanding" of his rights, and that he
then "act[ed] in a manner inconsistent with their exercise."5 7 Signifi-
cantly, in determining whether there has been an implied waiver of
rights, courts do not view the suspect's intent.58 Instead, the analysis is
limited to whether the suspect deliberately made a statement with full
knowledge of his rights.
Because waivers may be implied by the suspect's responses to
police, interrogators are not required to obtain waivers before begin-
ning interrogations.5 9 Instead, they may question any suspect who has
not invoked his rights.6 0 If, in the course of that questioning, the sus-
pect makes "an uncoerced statement to the police," he has impliedly
waived his right to remain silent.6 1 In essence, the court may find that
the suspect waived his right and freely chose to speak to police pre-
cisely because he did speak with police.6 2 Still, the Supreme Court has
been persistent-at least in its language-in its use of the term "full."
It has asserted that the warnings provide suspects with a full compre-
hension of their rights,63 and it requires a full understanding of those
rights before inferring a waiver from the circumstances. 64 But, as
Berghuis demonstrates, courts tend to readily find waivers. 65
The Berghuis Court found that Thompkins had impliedly waived
his right to remain silent.6 6 Officers initially gave him time to silently
read the five warnings printed on the card.6 7 They then asked him to
read the fifth warning aloud and, satisfied that he understood English,
56 See id.
57 Id. at 2262 (emphasis added).
58 Cf Thompson, supra note 4, at 661 ("The Court has found a valid waiver of
rights in cases in which the facts suggest that was not the suspect's intent . ).
59 See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2264.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 See, e.g., State v. Fluker, 1 A.3d 1216, 1223 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010) ("By speak-
ing, the defendant has chosen unambiguously not to assert his right to remain
silent.") (emphasis removed), appeal denied, 5 A.3d 491 (Conn. 2010).
63 See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986).
64 See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2261.
65 See Thompson, supra note 4, at 661 (arguing that eighty percent of suspects
waive their rights because the system of "issuing warnings and obtaining waivers could
not be easier").
66 See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2262.
67 See id.
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read him the remaining four.6 8 On this set of facts, the Court was
confident that Thompkins understood his rights, despite his unwill-
ingness to sign the form stating as much.69 Thus, the Court held,
"Thompkins's answer to [the detective's] question about whether
Thompkins prayed to God for forgiveness for shooting the victim
[was] a 'course of conduct indicating waiver' of the right to remain
silent. "70
Although the Miranda Court stated that "a valid waiver will not be
presumed ... simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventu-
ally obtained,"7 ' the Berghuis Court held that the incriminating state-
ment itself was the uncoerced statement necessary for an implied
waiver.7 2 Because there was no basis to find coercion,7 3 the Court
believed Thompkins's statement was voluntary; if he had wanted to
remain silent, he could have simply said nothing in response to the
question or invoked his right to remain silent.7 4 These are the only
two means the Court provided to protect against a finding of waiver:
silence or invocation.7 5  Seemingly any verbalized response, then,
aside from an invocation of rights, would have become a waiver of the
right to remain silent. This holding, as described by Justice
Sotomayor, "mark[s] a substantial retreat from the protection" pro-
vided by Miranda,76 because it disregards the fact that Miranda and its
progeny were premised on the belief that custodial interrogations are
inherently coercive.77
C. Post-Waiver Invocations
Even where there has been a valid waiver of Miranda rights, the
suspect retains control over the course of the interrogation. At all
times, the suspect holds the power to revoke his prior waiver by invok-
ing the right to remain silent.78 Such invocations protect against com-
68 See id.
69 See id.
70 Id. at 2263 (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)).
71 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
72 See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2263.
73 See id.
74 See id. For an explanation of why simply remaining silent in response to the
third question about his belief in God may not have actually been in Thompkins's
best interest, see infra Part II.C.
75 As described in Part I.C, the invocation must in fact be unambiguous.
76 Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2266 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
77 See id. at 2272; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
78 See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2262; id. at 2268 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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pulsory self-incrimination "by requiring an interrogation to cease,"79
on the assumption that any statement taken post-invocation is necessa-
rily the product of compulsion and a violation of the suspect's free
choice.80 Invocations of the right to remain silent cannot be used
against a criminal defendant in court.81 Such an allowance would be
an impermissible punishment of the exercise of a constitutional
right.82
To invoke his right to remain silent, a suspect must unambigu-
ously express his desire to do so. 8 3 An ambiguous statement, or no
statement at all, will not necessitate ending the interrogation.84 This
unambiguous invocation requirement establishes what the Berghuis
Court called "an objective inquiry that 'avoid [s] difficulties of proof
and .. . provide [s] guidance to officers on how to proceed in the face
of ambiguity."85 The requirement ensures that police do not have to
79 Id. at 2260, 2263-64 (majority opinion).
80 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
81 See id. at 468 n.37; United States v. Goldman, 563 F.2d 501, 503 (1st Cir. 1977)
(stating that the prosecution could not introduce evidence or comment on the defen-
dant's invocation of his right to remain silent).
82 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 n.37.
83 See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2260; see also Thompson, supra note 4, at 662 (stating,
prior to the Berghuis decision, that "[i]f a suspect clearly invokes the right to silence,
the police must immediately cease the interrogation."). This is the central holding of
Berghuis. The Miranda Court had stated that the interrogation must end if the suspect
"indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to
remain silent." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74 (emphasis added). Thus, Berghuis's
unambiguous invocation requirement is not what the Miranda Court had in mind, at
least insofar as it did not mean "in any manner, so long as it is unambiguous." As
Professor Strauss argues, by adding the unambiguous requirement, the Court has
"gone astray from what was intended in Miranda." Strauss, supra note 12, at 774.
84 See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2260.
85 Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1994) (alterations in
original). Justice Sotomayor disagreed that this inquiry was objective and argued that
many cases demonstrated that the very act of distinguishing "clear" from "ambiguous"
was a subjective exercise. See id. at 2277 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). In any event, as
with waivers, the invocation inquiry is intentionally divorced of concern for the sus-
pect's intent. The focus is entirely on what the police may have reasonably under-
stood from the suspect's statements, not what he intended when he made them. See
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (speaking about the right to counsel,
whose unambiguous invocation requirement now applies with equal force to the right
to remain silent, and stating that "if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is
ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances
would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel,"
interrogators are not required to end the interrogation).
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guess at a suspect's intent, and also protects against the suppression of
a voluntary confession any time a suspect uses ambiguous language.86
In practice, "unambiguous" has proven to be a difficult standard
for suspects to meet. Short of "I plead the Fifth,"87 few post-waiver
statements have been described as "unambiguous" in this context.88
For example, the following statements have been deemed ambiguous:
"I don't want to tell you guys anything to say about me in court."89
"[I]f you're not going to talk real talk, then we shouldn't talk."90
"I don't want to talk about it."91
86 See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2260.
87 Anderson v. Terhune, 516 F.3d 781, 787 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). The case
came from the state court on the defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id. at
783-84. Interestingly, the state court had struggled with whether even "I plead the
Fifth"-the seemingly least ambiguous statement one could make in an attempt to
invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege-was unambiguous. See id. at 787 ("In the pre-
sent case, the defendant's comments were ambiguous in context. . . .") (quoting the
state court's opinion). Initially, the Ninth Circuit accepted the state court's conclu-
sion that the statement was, in fact, ambiguous. See Anderson v. Terhune, 467 F.3d
1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he state-court conclusion is a reasonable determina-
tion of the facts."). Upon rehearing en banc, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed its
decision and "'I plead the Fifth' was finally found to plead the Fifth." Strauss, supra
note 12, at 799.
88 As Professor Strauss has explained, "court decisions have made it extremely
difficult for suspects who wish to assert their rights to do so. Judges have gone to
extraordinary lengths to classify even seemingly clear invocations as ambiguous invo-
cations which can be ignored by police." Strauss, supra note 12, at 775.
89 See State v. Nieves, No. A09-954, 2010 WL 2572126, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. June
29, 2010) (quoting State v. Day, 619 N.W.2d 745, 750 (Minn. 2000)).
90 See Barnes v. State, 696 S.E.2d 629, 632 (Ga. 2010).
91 See People v. Williams, 233 P.3d 1000, 1023 (Cal. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1602 (2011). Interestingly, the same phrase has been held to be an unambiguous
invocation as well. See Commonwealth v. Green, No. 0803, 2010 WL 3038733, at *6
(Mass. Super. Ct. June 25, 2010). In People v. Williams, the statement occurred in the
course of a fast-paced exchange between the defendant and the officer. See Williams,
233 P.3d at 1023. The California Supreme Court held that the statement was insuffi-
cient to invoke the right to remain silent because it was an expression of the defen-
dant's passing frustration with officers. Id. Thus, in context, it viewed the statement
as ambiguous. This rationale is problematic, because the reason for the suspect's
statement should be irrelevant; the question is merely whether the statement is unam-
biguous, not whether it is unambiguous and prompted by a desire to end the interro-
gation. See Strauss, supra note 12, at 790 ("[T]he motive for the suspect in invoking
the right to remain silent is irrelevant. It could be from a 'desire' not to speak or it
may not. In other words, a suspect who says, 'I really, really want to speak to you, but I
won't,' should be deemed to be invoking his right. The motive for not speaking-be
it a desire not to, the advice of attorney, fear, or even 'shock'-is irrelevant."). On
this point, the Ninth Circuit seems to have taken a very strong stance: "Using 'context'
to transform an unambiguous invocation into open-ended ambiguity defies both com-
mon sense and established Supreme Court law. It is not that context is unimportant,
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"I'm not going to talk about nothin'."92
"I just don't think that I should say anything."93
"I don't think I can talk . . . I guess I don't want to discuss it right
now."94
"I'm done. This is over."95
Merely remaining silent, of course, is per se ambiguous.96 Fur-
ther, statements expressing an unwillingness to talk about certain top-
ics will generally not be construed as "an unambiguous invocation of
the right to remain silent on all matters."97 Courts have even gone so
far as to hold that a soft-speaking suspect should know that when an
officer speaks in "a louder voice over him," his statement has not been
"clearly conveyed" because the officer could not hear it, thus render-
ing the statement ambiguous.98 Finally, adding language such as "I
but it simply cannot be manufactured by straining to raise a question regarding the
intended scope of a facially unambiguous invocation of the right to silence." Terhune,
516 F.3d at 787.
92 See United States v. Sherrod, 445 F.3d 980, 982 (7th Cir. 2006). Here, the
Seventh Circuit held that the statement, in context, was a "taunt" or "provocation" as
much as an invocation of rights. Id.
93 Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 200 (4th Cir. 2000); see also United States v.
Peters, 435 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that the Burket court considered the
phrase to be ambiguous).
94 See Strauss, supra note 12, at 791 n.91 and accompanying text.
95 State v. Saeger, No. 2009AP2133-CR, 2010 WL 3155264, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App.
Aug. 11, 2010) ("Taken in context, it was reasonable for the detectives to conclude
that his statement was merely a fencing mechanism to get a better deal-one that
would free him of exposure to federal charges. We acknowledge that a reasonable
person could also read his statement to mean that he actually wanted to invoke his
right to remain silent . . . . [H]owever, since there are reasonable competing infer-
ences that could be drawn from the statement, the statement is equivocal as a matter
of law and is therefore insufficient to invoke the right to remain silent."). For a more
exhaustive list of examples, see Weisselberg, supra note 53, at 1580-81.
96 See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976); United States v. Mahon, No. CR
09-712-PHX-DGC, 2010 WL 3954506, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 2010) ("[M]ere silence
does not invoke the Fifth Amendment right."); Barnes v. State, 696 S.E.2d 629, 631
(Ga. 2010) ("A defendant does not invoke his Miranda rights by remaining silent.");
State v. Bordeaux, No. COAO9-1484, 2010 WL 4286307, at *4 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 2,
2010) ("Defendant's silence or refusal to answer any of the detectives' questions could
not be construed as an invocation of his right to remain silent."); Strauss, supra note
12, at 792 ("Most courts . . . seem to deem silence, even lengthy silence, as
ambiguous.").
97 State v. Gonzalez, No. CR08236770T, 2010 WL 2927331, at *2 (Conn. Super.
Ct. June 25, 2010).
98 See United States v. Clark, 746 F. Supp. 2d 176, 186 (D. Me. 2010). This allow-
ance seems to encourage officers to speak over suspects if they know the suspects may
be trying to invoke their rights, because the very act of speaking over them makes
their statements ambiguous and renders their attempted invocation ineffective.
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think,"99 "I guess,"I 00 or "maybe" 01 will often make an otherwise
unambiguous statement ambiguous.10 2 Therefore, unambiguous
invocations require very direct language, such as "[I1 am] not answer-
ing any questions because I don't have to. I got the right to remain
silent." 0
In Berghuis, Thompkins failed to invoke his right to remain silent
because he never said "that he wanted to remain silent or that he did
not want to talk with the police." 10 4 Unlike most criminal suspects,
however, Thompkins did not have a post-waiver opportunity to invoke
his right to remain silent. He waived his right by answering "yes" to
the third question, 05 and that response was also his incriminating
statement. Still, Thompkins failed to affirmatively indicate that he did
not want to speak to the interrogators. As such, he did not invoke-or
even ambiguously attempt to invoke-his right to remain silent.ob
II. UNFAIR CONSEQUENCES OF THE COMPLICATED SYSTEM
"To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justfies
the means . . . would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious
doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face. "107
The unambiguous invocation requirement is not something a
criminal suspect is likely to understand on his own, and it is perhaps
even less likely that interrogators will inform him of the require-
99 See Sechrest v. Ignacio, 549 F.3d 789, 807 (9th Cir. 2008).
100 See Clark, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 185.
101 See Sechrest, 549 F.3d at 807.
102 See id.; Clark, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 185; Mahon, 2010 WL 3954506, at *2 (stating
that "[w]ords such as 'maybe' or 'I think' can introduce ambiguity" into a suspect's
attempted invocation).
103 Commonwealth v. Green, No. 0803, 2010 WL 3038733, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct.
June 25, 2010). As Professor Weisselberg notes, "courts tend to construe strictly the
requirement of an unequivocal assertion of rights, thus narrowing the duty of officers
to cease or refrain from questioning." Weisselberg, supra note 53, at 1580. Indeed,
case law tends to demand "lawyer-like clarity in order for suspects to invoke their
rights." Thompson, supra note 4, at 647.
104 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010).
105 Id. at 2263 ("Thompkins's answer to [the detective's] question about whether
Thompkins prayed to God for forgiveness for shooting the victim is a 'course of con-
duct indicating waiver' of the right to remain silent.") (quoting North Carolina v.
Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)).
106 This claim is true, of course, unless one views his very silence as an attempted
invocation. For an examination of this approach, see infra Part III.A.
107 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 480 (1966) (quoting Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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ment.108 However, the very reason for the warnings was the Court's
belief that the suspect should not be required or assumed to under-
stand his rights on his own.109 Under the current system, suspects
may be adequately warned of their rights' existence, but that informa-
tion may be denied any practical post-waiver effect since the warnings
include no information regarding their use. In short, knowing of the
right to remain silent is not enough to call the warnings fair or ade-
quate because suspects still do not know how to use that right during
the course of an interrogation. In this respect, the warnings' inade-
quacy results in three related and unfair results: Suspects do not know
how to invoke their rights, their attempted invocations are ignored,
and they unwittingly incriminate themselves by simply remaining
silent after having waived their right to do so.
A. Suspects Do Not Know How To Invoke Their Rights
The Berghuis Court held that a suspect who knows that his
Miranda rights may be invoked at any time "has the opportunity to
reassess his . . . immediate and long-term interests."110 While techni-
cally true, this claim is meaningless if the suspect cannot act upon his
reassessment. Suspects are generally given no guidance on how to
invoke their rights, and the required warnings certainly do not inform
them that they must do so unambiguously. Thus, when a suspect reas-
sesses the situation and decides that he should not answer any more
questions, he must rely on his own knowledge of the system to effectu-
ate his desire.11 A system in which the suspect must have significant
108 Cf Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2276 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that the
Miranda warnings "give no hint" that suspects need to unambiguously invoke the
right to remain silent and speculating that police are unlikely to inform suspects of
the Court's new requirement).
109 For a full discussion of the "why" behind Miranda, see supra Part L.A.
110 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2264.
111 Professor Rodes's discussion of due process protections applies with equal
force to the current state of the Miranda warnings. See Robert E. Rodes, Greatness
Thrust upon Them: Class Biases in American Law, 28 AM. J. JUR. 1, 10 (1983) ("They are
intended to secure justice, ... [b]ut they create in practice a machinery of power that
is accessible only to people who are familiar with it and know how to manipulate it-
or to those who can afford to hire such people."). In short, the Miranda warnings
achieve just results for those who have a good deal of understanding of and familiarity
with their rights. But this result is nonsensical; many people lack a high level under-
standing of their constitutional rights, and this is precisely the class Miranda sought to
protect, inform, and empower. To be truly fair, the warnings should also inform sus-
pects of how to invoke their continuing rights post-waiver. Without such knowledge,
interrogators may continue to rely on the fact that "uncertainty about the process as a
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knowledge about his rights-or significant luck" 2-in order to suc-
cessfully invoke the right to remain silent post-waiver violates "the
promise of Miranda at its most basic level-to truly protect the right to
remain silent."113 Indeed, "[t]hat right should not only be the prov-
ince of those fortunate enough or educated enough to say the right
words. The promise belongs to all."I1 4
Approximately eighty percent of suspects waive their rights and
agree to speak with police,115 but "almost no suspects [invoke] their
rights after a valid waiver."" 6 This fact is troubling because it means
that very few suspects fully utilize "what Miranda so carefully guaran-
teed"-control over whether and when to speak to police." 7 This
underutilization may be because "court decisions have made it
extremely difficult for suspects who wish to [invoke] their rights to do
so."118 In fact, it may be that "the only logical explanation for this
statistic is that the rules for [invoking] ... the right to remain silent
have become so difficult that almost no one is able to do it."119 How-
ever, the Miranda Court mandated that suspects be given a "continu-
ous opportunity" to exercise their right to remain silent.120 If a
suspect is unable to invoke his right to remain silent post-waiver,
whole will confuse a suspect and result in an admission beneficial to law enforce-
ment." Howard & Rich, supra note 33, at 704.
112 See Nicole Black, Silence is no longer golden, THE DAILY RECORD, http://web
cache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:AOAPF3ZaCLIJ:nylawblog.typepad.
com/suigeneris/criminallaw/+Miranda+jurisprudence+complicated&cd=6&hl=en&
ct=clnk&gl=us (June 7, 2010) ("[W]hen it comes to Miranda rights, the jurisprudence
has become so complicated, that the invocation of those rights requires specific words
. . . . In order to successfully invoke Miranda rights, an accused must either acciden-
tally stumble on the correct choice of words or take a course to learn about the
proper way to protect one's constitutional rights.").
113 Strauss, supra note 12, at 824.
114 Id.
115 Godsey, supra note 38, at 792 (stating that this fact "likely would have been a
major surprise to the Miranda Court").
116 Strauss, supra note 12, at 774.
117 Id. at 822.
118 Id. at 775. Professor Strauss also states that it is "almost impossible for a sus-
pect to [invoke] the right to remain silent after the waiver of rights," despite the fact
that Miranda "embraced" the idea that a suspect may choose not to talk to police
during an interrogation. Id. at 798.
119 Id. at 822 (emphasis added). Justice Sotomayor noted that "the Miranda warn-
ings give no hint that a suspect should use [the Court's] magic words, and there is
little reason to believe that police-who have ample incentives to avoid invocation-
will provide such guidance." Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2276 (2010)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
120 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
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"Miranda's promise. .. is an empty one." 121 And if he is unable to do
so because the warnings failed to apprise him of the complex and
demanding requirements placed on invocations, the warnings have
indeed failed to serve Miranda's "why."' 22
In Berghuis, Thompkins was told that he had "the right to decide
at any time before or during questioning to use [his] right to remain
silent."123 The Court believed this warning "made clear" that his right
to remain silent "could be asserted at any time."1 2 4 However, the
Court's language here is surprisingly imprecise. Nothing about being
told of a continuing ability to use the right to remain silent informs
the suspect that he must assert that right. In truth, a suspect may well
believe that he is using his right when he simply remains silent after
the interrogator asks a question he does not wish to answer. Indeed,
even judges have struggled with this concept. 125 Thus, supposing
Thompkins had wished to use his right to remain silent instead of
answering the third question-and thus avoid making an incriminat-
ing statement-he might have simply remained silent. However, his
silence would not have counted as an invocation,126 and the interroga-
tion would have continued in spite of the attempt. This possibility
directly results from his lack of knowledge regarding how to invoke
his rights.
B. Those Seeking to Invoke Their Rights Are Ignored
Ample evidence suggests "that criminal suspects often use equivo-
cal or colloquial language in attempting to invoke their right to
silence." 127 Because courts readily call such language ambiguous, 128
121 Strauss, supra note 12, at 775.
122 See supra Part L.A.
123 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2256 (emphasis added). This additional warning is not
at all uncommon. In fact, eighty percent of jurisdictions include some variation of
this very warning. See Weisselberg, supra note 53, at 1566. Nor is the warning mis-
placed, as suspects do have a continuing right to remain silent. See Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 444-45; Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2263-64 ("If the . .. right to remain silent is invoked
at any point during questioning, further interrogation must cease.") (emphasis added).
However, the warning is inadequate because it provides no guidance on how the sus-
pect may use his right post-waiver. More specifically, it fails to tell the suspect how he
may use his right without incriminating himself. See infra Part II.C.
124 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2262 (emphasis added).
125 See, e.g., Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588, 603 (5th Cir. 2002) (Moss, J., dissent-
ing) ("What in the world must an individual do to exercise his constitutional right to
remain silent beyond actually, in fact, remaining silent?").
126 The same result would obtain if he had made an ambiguous statement (e.g., "I
don't think I should talk anymore").
127 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2277 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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these attempts are properly ignored by the police. 129 Certain groups
will feel the effects of this reality more severely than others. Ambigu-
ous speech styles-such as indirect and polite speech (e.g., "Do you
think I should answer that?") or hedged and softened speech (e.g.,
"Maybe I shouldn't say anything")-are more likely to be used by
"powerless" groups, such as the less educated or those of lower socio-
economic status.130 Those who are "better educated and more afflu-
ent" are likely to "have a clearer understanding of their rights" and
"will be inclined to assert them more directly."13 1 However, even
among that group, "it is inevitable that people [will] react to custodial
interrogation with some degree of intimidation," and "[i]t is normal
to respond to intimidation by sounding meek or tentative rather than
precise, clear, and assertive."132 Indeed, "most common interrogation
techniques operate by instilling [the] belief' that the suspect is "in a
position of powerlessness in the stationhouse."'33 The unfortunate
result, then, may be that only "hardened" criminals who are accus-
tomed to the interrogation setting will be able to assert their rights
128 See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
129 See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) ("[I]f a suspect makes a
reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in
light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be
invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of ques-
tioning."); id. at 461 ("[W]e decline to adopt a rule requiring officers to ask clarifying
questions."). Thus, interrogators are not required to end the interrogation or ask
clarifying questions; they are free to ignore the ambiguous statement and continue
asking questions.
130 LAWRENCE M. SoLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE LANGUAGE
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 60-61 (2005). Speaking in the context of the right to counsel,
the Supreme Court has also recognized that its unambiguous invocation requirement
may disadvantage certain groups. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 460 ("We recognize that
requiring a clear assertion of the right to counsel might disadvantage some suspects
who-because of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other rea-
sons-will not clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actually want to
have a lawyer present.").
131 SoIAN & TIERSMA, supra note 130, at 60.
132 Strauss, supra note 12, at 806. Perhaps more problematic is the fact that, to the
everyday person, "[t]he use of hedges or modal verbs and even questions ... [is]
typically treated as unambiguous. For example, if a customer tells a waitress, 'I think
I'll take a tuna sandwich,' virtually all would interpret that as a clear enough request
for a tuna sandwich. .. . Yet, in the hostile, frightening environment of an interroga-
tion setting, the police can ignore such comments . . . ." Id. at 807.
133 Weisselberg, supra note 53, at 1589. As a result, suspects may use ambiguous
language "[t]o avoid offending those in power . .. but tentative assertions of rights
will not be recognized as invocations under an 'unambiguous or unequivocal' stan-
dard." Id.
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with sufficient clarity to constitute an invocation. 134 Given the setting,
any other person-rich or poor, educated or uneducated-is likely to
feel intimidated and may attempt to invoke his right to remain silent
with ambiguous language as a result. Such an attempt will have abso-
lutely no effect.13 5
Knowing that his wishes have been ignored, such a suspect "may
well see further objection as futile and confession (true or not) as the
only way to end his interrogation."13 6 Indeed, when interrogators
ignore a sincerely attempted but ambiguous invocation of the right to
remain silent, the probability that the suspect will attempt to reassert
that right in the future is remote.'3 7 Professor Strauss summed up this
result succinctly:
After all, the suspect does not say to himself, "Oh yes, I must say it
more clearly, that's why they ignored me. Next time, I'll say 'I am
invoking my right to remain silent' and all will be well." Rather, the
police officer's response reinforces those feelings of hopelessness
and intimidation that cause the ambiguous request in the first
place.' 38
This result is especially troubling, as suspects' inability to invoke their
constitutional rights because of the intimidating interrogation envi-
ronment is exactly what the Miranda Court sought to prevent. 13 9
134 See Strauss, supra note 12, at 806.
135 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259-60 (2010) ("If an accused
makes a statement concerning the right to counsel [or of silence] 'that is ambiguous
or equivocal' or makes no statement, the police are not required to end the interroga-
tion or ask questions to clarify whether the accused wants to invoke his . . . Miranda
rights . . . ." (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994)) (citations
omitted)).
136 Id. at 2278 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Professor Strauss also voiced this con-
cern: "A suspect who felt that he had asserted his right to end the interrogation but
was ignored will now be convinced that any further attempt to assert his rights will be
futile. No wonder suspects so often not only continue to respond to questions, but
often soon thereafter make incriminating statements." Strauss, supra note 12, at 798.
137 See Strauss, supra note 12, at 798; see also Thompson, supra note 4, at 664-65
(stating that the Court has "opted for a regime that [will] allow the police deliberately
to ignore a suspect's attempts to invoke the Miranda rights, a practice that in and of
itself can increase the coercive atmosphere Miranda was intended to dispel").
138 Strauss, supra note 12, at 815.
139 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (stating that the warnings
must be provided to combat "the inherently compelling pressures" of the custodial
interrogation environment, "which work to undermine the individual's will to resist
and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.").
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C. Suspects Unwittingly Incriminate Themselves by Remaining Silent
There is a specific and rarely discussed instance when an individ-
ual's silence may be used against him in court, and when the jury is
permitted to make inferences about his state of mind, and even his
guilt, from such silence. Recall that, post-waiver, a suspect must
unambiguously invoke his right to remain silent to avoid answering a
potentially incriminating question.140 Assume, instead, that the sus-
pect merely remains silent in the face of such a question. That
instance of silence will always be ambiguous and is thus never an invo-
cation. 141 Because it has come post-waiver, it is admissible in evidence
at trial and available for the prosecutor's comment.142 In speaking of
such silence, the prosecutor is not commenting on the suspect's invo-
cation of a constitutional right precisely because, as defined by the
Supreme Court, there has been no invocation.
Indeed, it would make little sense, given the requirements placed
on invocations, to disallow the use of that silence in court; unambigu-
ous invocations are required after waivers, and silence simply cannot
be called unambiguous. However, this use of post-waiver silence vio-
lates the implicit promise of Miranda's second warning-that, unlike
what the suspect says, his silence cannot be used against him in a court
of law.143 While it is true that a suspect could also reason from the
140 See supra Part I.C.
141 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
142 See, e.g., United States v. Goldman, 563 F.2d 501, 504 (1st Cir. 1977) (stating
that the defendant's "silent response to a particular question" was given "enhanced
probative value" by the fact that he spoke on some subjects); Commonwealth v.
Womack, 929 N.E.2d 943, 951 (Mass. 2010) (holding that the defendant's silence was
a failure to respond to a particular question, not an invocation of the right to remain
silent, and was thus admissible in evidence); Commonwealth v. Senior, 744 N.E.2d
614, 621 (Mass. 2001) (holding that the prosecutor's statements about the defen-
dant's silence when asked where he had been drinking were permissible because the
defendant had not invoked his right to remain silent); People v. Parker, No. 290941,
2010 WL 3656019, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2010) ("Where a defendant decides
to speak and waive his Miranda rights, anything he says, or does not say, is admissible
until he invokes his right to silence."), appeal denied 797 N.W.2d 162 (Mich. 2011).
Cases involving the introduction of post-waiver silence to establish guilt have been
admittedly rare, but there is little reason for that rarity to continue. Unless there has
been an invocation, post-waiver silence is a usable and relevant piece of the interroga-
tion. There is no constitutional justification for refusing to use it. As such, a prolifer-
ation of these kinds of cases can perhaps be expected.
143 See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Hale, 422 U.S.
171, 182-83 (1975) (White, J., concurring) ("Surely [the defendant] was not
informed here that his silence, as well as his words, could be used against him at trial.
Indeed, anyone would reasonably conclude from Miranda warnings that this would
not be the case.").
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first Miranda warning that his post-waiver silence may be used against
him,144 that reasoning requires a full understanding of one's rights
and the consequences of waiver, an understanding which many sus-
pects do not have.145 Additionally, when a suspect is told he may "use"
his right to remain silent at any time, he has no reason to believe that
his "use" may in fact be used against him. Finally, the contradictory
messages that flow from the first and second warnings only demon-
strate the weaknesses of the Miranda warnings themselves. Depending
on his starting point, it is reasonable for the suspect to conclude both
that his silence may be used against him and that it cannot be so used.
This confusion may cause suspects who intend to invoke their rights to
simply remain silent and, in so doing, actually incriminate themselves.
For example, if Thompkins had simply remained silent after the
detective's third question, his silence may have been introduced as
evidence against him in court.14 6 The prosecutor could have com-
mented on that silence in his opening or closing statement, directing
the jury to infer that Thompkins had something to hide, or that he
had a guilty conscience.
There may not be empirical evidence to suggest that suspects who
remain silent post-waiver actually intend to invoke their rights and cut
off questioning. But common sense tells us that if the suspect knew
144 The first Miranda warning provides that the suspect has a right to remain
silent. If the suspect voluntarily waives that right, he can reason that he is no longer
able to merely remain silent in the interrogation. The inference made from the sec-
ond warning would no longer apply. However, this conclusion would not necessarily
be so simple or reasonable when the suspect has been told, as Thompkins was, that he
may use his rights at any time, especially when he has been given no guidance on how
he may use them. See Weisselberg, supra note 53, at 1566 (claiming that eighty per-
cent of jurisdictions include a warning which provides that the suspect may use or
assert his rights at any time).
145 Id. at 1563 ("The best evidence is now that a significant percentage of suspects
simply cannot comprehend the warnings or the rights they are intended to convey.").
146 Thompkins's hypothetical silence after the third question could have been
introduced at trial if the court found that he had previously waived his right to remain
silent. While the Supreme Court found that Thompkins's answer to the third ques-
tion constituted a waiver of rights, it hinted that his other responses may have also
been sufficient to establish waiver. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2263
(2010) ("This [finding of waiver] is confirmed by the fact that before [the three ques-
tions] Thompkins had given sporadic answers to questions throughout the interroga-
tion."). In fact, his affirmative answers to the first two questions in the series may have
been sufficient to constitute waiver as well. If the court concluded that there had
been a valid waiver of rights prior to that hypothetical instance of silence,
Thompkins's silence could have been introduced as substantive evidence of his guilt.
See State v. Aguero, 791 N.W.2d 1, 11 (N.D. 2010) ("The testimony about [the defen-
dant's] post-Miranda silence . . . was used as substantive evidence of his guilt.").
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how to invoke his rights and that his silence could be used against him
in court, he would properly invoke his right instead of merely remain-
ing silent and incriminating himself. The suspect who merely remains
silent understands that he should not respond to the question, and he
does not want to answer it precisely because he fears that his response
may incriminate him. He is, of course, unaware that his silence in that
instance is only marginally better than a more direct manifestation of
his guilty conscience or that, in fact, jurors are free to treat them as
functional equivalents.
There is a high probability that jurors will negatively view a crimi-
nal defendant's silence in the face of an accusation or potentially
incriminating question. As the Supreme Court noted in United States
v. Hale,14 7 silence has "probative weight where it persists in the face of
an accusation, since it is assumed in such circumstances that the
accused would be more likely than not to dispute an untrue accusa-
tion." 148 The fact that prosecutors are introducing post-waiver silence
into evidence and commenting on it during their opening and closing
statements' 4 9 only reinforces the logical conclusion that such silence
has an effect on the jury, as it seems safe to conclude that prosecutors
generally do not include random or irrelevant information in their
attempts to persuade juries of defendants' guilt. Thus, even though
we cannot directly see how frequently instances of post-waiver silence
tip the scales in the prosecution's favor, we at least know that prosecu-
tors sometimes believe they do. Any allowance of such evidence that
comes at the expense of a constitutional right-or, more precisely,
that results from a suspect's ignorance of how to invoke a constitu-
tional right-is problematic, as it represents the current warnings' fail-
ure to achieve the purposes for which they are required.150 Further,
by allowing a suspect to remain silent without ever warning that such
silence can be used against him, we have established a system that
preys on the suspect's ignorance to establish his guilt.15 1 That result is
147 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
148 Id. at 176.
149 See, e.g., Aguero, 791 N.W.2d at 11; People v. Parker, No. 290941, 2010 WL
3656019, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2010); State v. Watson, No. 1 CA-CR 09-
0263, 2010 WL 2977544, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 29, 2010).
150 See supra Part I.A.
151 In this instance, the system is not preying on the suspect's ignorance of his
rights. In fact, it directly informs him of his constitutional right to remain silent.
However, it leaves him to infer the consequences of his post-waiver silence and
entirely fails to inform him of how he may invoke his right to remain silent post-waiver
if he desires to do so. Thus, the system preys on his ignorance of the invocation
process and the consequences of his silence.
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violative of the very "fair-trial principles" at the heart of the Miranda
decision.152
II1. ALTERNAITVE SOLUTIONS
"[Our system of justice is not founded on a fear that a suspect will exercise
his rights. 'If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness
of a system of law enforcement, then there is something
very wrong with that system. ""1s
The current system of warnings does not adequately inform sus-
pects of how they may use their rights. In particular, suspects who
have initially chosen to waive the right to remain silent have no gui-
dance regarding how they may later invoke it. Thus, such suspects
have their intentions ignored or, worse, unwittingly incriminate them-
selves by merely remaining silent in the belief that they are using their
rights. Because Miranda's warnings have failed in this respect, "the
time has come to begin the search for alternative remedies."5 4 Sev-
eral alternatives could solve this complicated problem and ensure that
suspects who decide to waive their rights are treated fairly and have
their wishes honored. Either the Court could reexamine its prece-
dents regarding post-waiver silence, clarifying questions, or the pres-
ence of counsel, or it could amend the now inadequate warnings. 5 5
152 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2278 (2010) (Sotomayor,J., dissent-
ing). A situation in which whatever the suspect does-speak or remain silent-can be
used against him at trial can hardly be called fair. See State v. Hassel, 696 N.W.2d 270,
274 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005) ("[W]hen both silence and statements can be used against a
defendant as evidence of guilt, the right against self-incrimination becomes impossi-
ble to invoke because anything the accused does is evidence for the State.").
153 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 458 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964)).
154 Thompson, supra note 4, at 650.
155 The Miranda Court invited Congress and the States to devise alternative meth-
ods of protecting the rights it sought to protect, with the only requirement being that
such methods be "at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of
silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it." Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966); see also David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Con-
gress, 99 MICH. L. REv. 958, 969 (2001) ("The Miranda opinion itself famously sug-
gested that the precise rules established by that case were subject to being modified by
congressional or state legislation, so long as the legislation provided protection
equivalent to that provided by the Miranda rules themselves."). Thus, any change to
the warnings could come from the Supreme Court or practically any other branch of
government. See Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe
Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MicH. L. REv. 1030,
1054 (2001) ("[P]rophylactic rules and incidental rights are fully open to revision by
Congress, federal executive action, and state legislative, executive or judicial action.").
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Each of the suggested methods may result in more suspects invoking
their rights and ending interrogations. As such, each may result in
fewer confessions.' 5 6 But each also moves closer to Miranda's goal of
fully informing suspects of their rights and ensuring that confessions
are the products of individuals' free choice.157
A. Solutions That Require a Reexamination of Precedent
1. Treat All Instances of Silence as Invocations
First, and most disruptively, the Supreme Court could hold that
all instances of post-waiver silence are affirmative invocations of the
right to remain silent.15 8 This holding would fundamentally alter the
current method of invocation by requiring interrogators to cease
questioning in the face of what is now seen as ambiguous conduct. In
effect, such a holding would overrule Berghuis by allowing an ambigu-
ous act to constitute an invocation.15 9 The Court could avoid this
problem definitionally; it could continue to require unambiguous
invocations but hold that silence is not ambiguous. In other words,
the Court could count silence itself as an "unambiguous invocation"
of the right to remain silent. Either way, post-waiver silence would be
inadmissible in evidence, just as current invocations are inadmissible.
Suspects attempting to invoke their rights post-waiver by remaining
Still, the Supreme Court will always "have the final say as to whether alternative pro-
phylactic rules and rights provided by legislators, law enforcement agencies, and state
judges sufficiently protect the Bill of Rights in a manner the Court can effectively
oversee." Id. For a closer examination of Congress's potential role in reformulating
the warnings, see Strauss, supra note 12, at 960 ("The conclusion that Miranda is as
legitimate as other well-established constitutional principles does not entail, however,
that Congress is precluded from modifying it."); id. at 974 ("[O]nce constitutional
rights are understood, as they must be, as partly but inevitably 'prophylactic' in
nature, there should be no objection, in principle, to Congress's playing a role in
their elaboration."). Regardless, the examination of precisely which branch should
alter the warning is beyond the scope of this Note. As such, this Note proceeds on the
assumption that the change will come from the Supreme Court.
156 For an explanation of why such an increase in post-waiver invocations is not a
result we should seek to avoid, see infra note 190 and accompanying text.
157 See supra Part L.A.
158 Because the suspect has already waived his right to simply remain silent, the
Court is unable to describe an instance of post-waiver silence as merely an exercise of
the right without also saying that it will require interrogators to cease the interroga-
tion (i.e., the Court must call it an invocation). Although the suspect has a continu-
ous right to remain silent, his post-waiver use of that right necessitates an
invocation-some showing that he wishes to revoke his previous waiver.
159 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010) (holding that invoca-
tions of the right to remain silent must be unambiguous).
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silent would thus be protected from having that silence used against
them in court because no post-warning silence could be used in court.
While Miranda may overprotect the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, 60 counting silence itself as an invocation
would dramatically overprotect the right to remain silent. It would
require interrogators to stop the interrogation even when the suspect
had no intention of doing so. This result would be especially anoma-
lous given that those who actually intended to invoke but used ambig-
uous language in their attempt could still be ignored. Further, such a
rule would be contrary to common sense; the ability to remain silent
in response to the interrogator's question is precisely what the suspect
previously waived. Thus, it makes little sense to end interrogations on
the basis of mere silence. More troublesome, however, is the unwork-
able standard this approach would create for interrogators. For exam-
ple, an officer faced with such silence would have to answer difficult
questions such as: "How long must the suspect persist in his silence
before it becomes an invocation?"; "Is the suspect actively thinking
about the question, or is he attempting to assert his rights?"; and "Is
the suspect simply uncomfortable with this particular question, or
embarrassed by the fact that I am asking it?"-which raises another
problematic question, "Can I just move on?"16' Thus, without a
requirement of clarifying questions, which would essentially force the
suspect to make a clear statement of his intent, this approach would
substantially overprotect the right to remain silent and diminish the
utility of custodial interrogations. For these reasons, the Court is not
likely to reexamine its position in Berghuis, nor should it, because a
simpler, less disruptive, and equally effective solution is available.162
160 See Klein, supra note 155, at 1033 ("A prophylactic rule potentially overprotects
the constitutional clause at issue . . . .").
161 Indeed, the existence and difficulty of such questions animated the majority's
position in Berghuis. See Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2260 ("If an ambiguous act, omission, or
statement could require police to end the interrogation, police would be required to
make difficult decisions about an accused's unclear intent and face the consequences
of suppression 'if they guess wrong."' (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452,
461 (1993))).
162 See infra Part III.B. Additionally, the Court's unambiguous invocation require-
ment should not be reexamined, because an invocation "entitles a suspect to action
by another party"-namely, it requires officers to end the interrogation-and so "it
seems only fair that the suspect be required to communicate a request for that action
clearly." The Supreme Court, 2009 Term-Leading Cases, 124 HARv. L. REv. 179, 197
(2010).
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2. Require Interrogators to Ask Clarifying Questions
In Berghuis, Justice Sotomayor stated that the Court's clear-state-
ment rule, coupled with its failure to adopt even the "straightforward
mechanism" of requiring officers to ask clarifying questions after a
suspect makes an ambiguous statement regarding his right to remain
silent, ensures that "some poorly expressed requests [to remain silent]
will be disregarded."1 63 While the requirement of clarifying questions
has not gained traction in the Supreme Court, other courts do require
officers to ask clarifying questions. 1 6 4
As previously mentioned, a requirement that interrogators ask
clarifying questions would better protect suspects' ability to invoke
their right to remain silent when they intend to do so. 1 65 This result is
primarily achieved in two ways. First, clarifying questions eliminate
the scenario in which a suspect-who is always the weaker party1 6 6-is
required to assume a position of power and assert his rights. Instead,
they force the more powerful party-the interrogator-to ask a direct
question regarding the suspect's desire or intent.167 Second, by doing
so, they allow the suspect to "unambiguously" express his desire to
invoke his right to remain silent by simply answering "yes" or "no."16 8
163 Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2277 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 467 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring)).
This disregard is problematic in itself. See supra Part II.B.
164 See, e.g., State v. Winkler, No. 08-11-0262, 2010 WL 3834876, at *3 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. Aug. 24, 2010) ("When a defendant makes an ambiguous assertion of
his right to remain silent, the police must stop the questioning until the ambiguity has
been resolved.").
165 "Clarifying questions help protect the rights of the suspect by ensuring that he
gets an attorney if he wants one, and will minimize the chance of a confession being
suppressed due to subsequent judicial second-guessing as to the meaning of the sus-
pect's statement regarding counsel." Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994)
(commenting, obviously, on the right to counsel, but in language equally applicable
to the right to remain silent).
166 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966) (stating that the warnings are
"an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation
atmosphere" because "[i]t is not just the subnormal or woefully ignorant who suc-
cumb to an interrogator's imprecations, whether implied or expressly stated, that the
interrogation will continue until a confession is obtained or that silence in the face of
accusation is itself damning and will bode ill when presented to a jury").
167 See Thompson, supra note 4, at 664 ("[T]he whole point of asking for clarifica-
tion . . . is that the suspect is then forced to answer the question more definitely.")
(emphasis added).
168 For example, a "yes" or "no" response will always unambiguously express the
suspect's desire if an officer must ask questions such as: "Are you saying that you no
longer wish to speak with me?"; "Do you want to continue speaking with me?"; or
"Would you like to end this interrogation?"
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In this manner, clarifying questions would better protect suspects'
constitutional rights. However, like the previous alternative, the
Supreme Court has already expressly rejected this approach.1 69 Given
stare decisis and the Court's general approach to Miranda cases,170
there are strong reasons not to adopt the requirement. In asking the
clarifying questions, officers may be signaling to the suspect that invo-
cation is wise or in his best interest, or at the very least that he ought
to reconsider his desire to speak with them if he had not done so
already. Such a result would counter the Miranda Court's understand-
ing of the interrogation environment, which it acknowledged was nec-
essarily adversarial.171 For this reason, there again remains a simpler
and less disruptive alternative that would equally protect suspects'
desires.17 2
3. Require Counsel for Suspects Prior to All Interrogations
The Supreme Court could require that suspects have an attorney
present for all custodial interrogations. 73 Attorneys would be able to
counsel their suspect-clients and ensure that they appropriately invoke
their rights when they desire to do sO.174 Thus, the inclusion of attor-
neys would undoubtedly serve Miranda's purpose.175 As Professor
Duke states, however, "putting lawyers in the interrogation room,
169 See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461.
170 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443-44 (2000) (stating that the
Court has consistently attempted to reduce the impact Miranda has on legitimate law
enforcement while reaffirming its core holding that unwamed statements cannot be
used in the prosecution's case-in-chief).
171 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 (explaining that the warning providing that any-
thing a suspect said could be used against him in court would "serve to make the
individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system-
that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest").
172 See infra Part III.B. Significantly, the proposal to amend the warnings would
allow a suspect to act on a reassessment he had made on his own, without being
prompted to reconsider his decision by officers' questions.
173 See generally Steven B. Duke, Does Miranda Protect the Innocent or the Guilty?, 10
CHAP. L. REv. 551, 566-69 (2007) (discussing potential changes intended to increase
the reliability of confessions and reduce the pressures of interrogation); Klein, supra
note 155, at 1057-58 (considering methods of dispelling the compulsion inherent in
custodial interrogation).
174 In truth, the attorneys would fulfill the informative function where the
Miranda warnings proved inadequate. An attorney familiar with the process and
knowledgeable about the requirements could inform his suspect-client of the neces-
sary specificity, so that when the suspect wanted to invoke his right to remain silent,
he could.
175 See Klein, supra note 155, at 1058 ("[P]utting attorneys in the interrogation
room would fulfill all three functions of the prophylactic rule . . . .").
2011) 447
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
would gravely curtail the utility of police interrogation."17 6 Indeed,
such a change might effectively end all custodial interrogations, as
lawyers would frequently advise their clients to invoke their rights and
remain silent. Since the Supreme Court has maintained that the
fruits of custodial interrogations (i.e., confessions) are an "unmiti-
gated good,"177 this requirement is unlikely to be adopted. If the
Court acknowledges the problems identified in this Note, it is likely to
look elsewhere for the solution.
B. Update the Miranda Warnings
When the Miranda Court formulated its four required warnings,
it acknowledged its inability to foresee all the alternatives for better
protecting the right to remain silent and noted that future changes
might be acceptable.178 The Miranda Court also believed that only an
"effective and express explanation" of rights could assure that suspects
would be "truly in a position to exercise [them]."179 The current
176 Duke, supra note 173, at 567.
177 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 (1991). The Miranda Court itself
admitted that confessions would remain "a proper element in law enforcement."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
178 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
179 Id. at 473 (emphasis added). Professor Weisselberg has argued that no "system
of standardized warnings can empower suspects to assert their rights." Weisselberg,
supra note 53, at 1524-25; id. at 1563-77. The absoluteness of his statement seems
exaggerated, and the Supreme Court is unlikely to overrule Miranda in the very near
future. It might, however, embrace an improved warning system. See M.KB. Darmer,
Lessons from the Lindh Case: Public Safety and the Fifth Amendment, 68 BROOK. L. REV.
241, 284 (2002) ("While it is unthinkable that the Court would soon reconsider
wholesale its recent decision reaffirming Miranda, incremental reformulations and
doctrinal shifts are not only plausible, but perfectly consistent with the Court's past
practice."); Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation,
2000 Sup. CT. REV. 61, 61-64 (2000) (stating that the United States v. Dickerson majority
"reassured the legal community and the nation at large that this pillar of the Warren
Court's criminal procedure revolution [(i.e. Miranda v. Arizona)] would remain stand-
ing" and that the Court "ma[de] clear that Miranda is here to stay"). And perhaps we
should not want it any other way. See Thomas, supra note 36, at 549 ("[F]or all my
disillusionment with Miranda, I would not wish it overruled because the warnings
may, in a small but significant number of cases, cause suspects to resist being coerced
into confessing."). In any event, we are likely stuck-for better or worse-with a sys-
tem of standardized warnings. See Godsey, supra note 38, at 786 (suggesting that
there may be no "politically palatable method by which suspects could be advised of
their rights other than the suggested procedure of having police officers recite the
warnings"). Thus, Miranda may in fact be a "straightjacket" in the sense that warnings
will always be required, but just not in the sense that only the four warnings required
by the Miranda Court are permissible (i.e., additional warnings could be added). See
id. at 787; Dorf & Friedman, supra, at 64 ("The four particular warnings set forth in
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warnings do not meet this requirement because they do not effectively
inform suspects of how to invoke the right to remain silent post-
waiver.180 The warnings' constancy, 81 despite Miranda's evolving
application,' 82 suggests that the current warnings fall short. As Profes-
sor Godsey notes, the warnings are not up-to-date and, in light of
recent holdings like Berghuis, no longer "provide suspects with suffi-
cient information to make an 'informed choice."
183
Explanatory statements and additional warnings would better sat-
isfy Miranda's requirements and could be used to supplement the cur-
rent warnings.184 In particular, statements regarding how a suspect
Miranda are not constitutionally required 'in the sense that nothing else will suffice to
satisfy constitutional requirements.'" (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428, 442 (2000))). The warnings can be supplemented, and any amendment to the
current warnings which might better empower suspects to invoke their rights when
they desire to do so should be added, even if it will not completely empower them and
would not represent the optimum protection if we were to start from scratch.
180 Indeed, the current warnings do not even "reasonably convey" how a suspect
may use his rights post-waiver. Howard & Rich, supra note 33, at 705 (emphasis
added). Whatever the test, a warning system that informs the suspect that he has a
continuous right, and then operates under a rule whereby he is required to speak in
particular language to use it in a specific circumstance (e.g. by requiring him to
unambiguously invoke it post-waiver), cannot be called adequate unless it also
informs the suspect of that requirement or otherwise ensures that he knows how he
may use the right in that circumstance.
181 See Godsey, supra note 38, at 782-83 ("The Supreme Court has often stated
that the Miranda warnings requirement is a prophylactic rule that can change and
evolve. However, in spite of forty years of legal developments and practical experi-
ence, the content of these famous four warnings has never been modified or even
been subjected to systematic scrutiny." (emphasis added)); id. at 825 ("Since Miranda
was decided in 1966, courts and scholars have devoted little substantive attention to
the content of the warnings. In this time, however, much has changed[,] . . . [but]
the content of the warnings has remained static, failing to keep pace with the dra-
matic changes in its environs.").
182 See Howard & Rich, supra note 40, at 706. Professor Belsky argued long ago
that the increased complexity of the criminal justice system, coupled with then-recent
Supreme Court decisions, has "lessened, rather than increased, protection for sus-
pects." Martin H. Belsky, Whither Miranda ?, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1341, 1360 (1984)
(reviewing LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS (1983)). The warning
system may thus "lull us into believing that we are protecting the rights of individuals
against the state[,]" but, truly, it only "masks changes both in the criminal justice
system and in our society." Id. at 1361.
183' Godsey, supra note 38, at 817.
184 Any change made to the current warnings "should ensure that [they] remain
consistent with and continue to reflect the evolving legal principles that support and
justify their existence, and . . . reaffirm that they remain effective in upholding and
enforcing the constitutional rights of suspects." Id. at 783. The addition of a warning
informing suspects of how to invoke their rights would in fact legitimize the warnings
system itself, as "[t]here can be no legitimate justification for a warning and waiver
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may invoke his right to remain silent post-waiver could be added to
inform him that he must clearly state his desire to rely on his rights.185
Indeed, this would be the simplest approach to removing the unfair-
ness' 86 inherent in the current system.' 87 It would not require any
case to be overruled; it would not produce difficult questions for
police to answer;188 and it would not reduce the utility of custodial
regime unless we administer warnings in a way that suspects understand, and unless
we provide a meaningful opportunity for suspects to exercise free will in the sta-
tionhouse." Weisselberg, supra note 53, at 1590. Significantly, under this analysis, it is
the suspect's opportunity to exercise his free will that should be protected. To truly
have a "meaningful opportunity" to exercise his free will post-waiver, a suspect must
know how to invoke his rights.
185 See Editorial, Speaking Up to Stay Silent, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2010, at A24, availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/02/opinion/02wed2.html? r=1&partner=rss
&emc=rss (arguing for, among other things, a change to the Miranda warnings to
include a statement that the suspect must clearly speak of his desire to invoke his
rights); SCOTUS Guts Miranda; Law Enforcement Warning Needs Rewrite, THE HOME OF
SDP123A DOT COM (Jun. 2, 2010), http://www.sdpl23a.com/index.php?option&task=
view&id=SDP123A.com ("[T]he Miranda warning that police read to suspects prior to
interrogating them simply must be edited to include explicit instructions on what sus-
pects must do to [invoke] their right to remain silent. It is patently ludicrous-to say
nothing of obviously unfair-to inform a suspect of his right to remain silent only to
keep him in the dark as to what standard he has to meet in order to legally avail
himself of said right. The Miranda warning is clearly the appropriate place for that
knowledge to be communicated.").
186 "Miranda is based on fairness in the sense that it is unfair and unethical for
officers to obtain confessions when a suspect simply does not understand his rights."
Daniel J. Croxall, Comment, Inferring Uniformity: Towards Deduction and Certainty in the
Miranda Context, 39 McGEORGE L. REv. 1025, 1041 (2008). Insofar as an additional
warning would increase a suspect's understanding of how he may invoke his right
post-waiver, it would help to ensure that he only speaks voluntarily, a result Miranda
requires. See supra Part I.A. Such a warning would also strike the appropriate balance
between individual rights and law enforcement by ensuring that suspects know what
interrogators already understand-that invocations must be unambiguous. As things
stand today, "the balance between law enforcement and suspects' rights, established
forty years ago by the Miranda decision, has been lost to law enforcement." Daria K
Boxer, Miranda with Precision: Why the Current Circuit Split Should Be Solved in Favor of a
Uniform Requirement of an Explicit Warning of the Right to Have Counsel Present During
Interrogation, 37 Sw. U. L. REV. 425, 446 (2008).
187 See The Supreme Court Looks at Miranda and Ethics, ETHICS AIARus, http://ethics
alarms.com/2010/06/02/2012/ (June 2, 2010 6:24 PM) ("If the suspect knows he
can stop the questioning at any time, there seems nothing unfair about the police
questioning him until he does. The interrogation is not coercion if the suspect has
the power to end it, and knows that.").
188 See supra Part III.A.1 for an explanation of why holding that silence may count
as an invocation would achieve these two results. See supra Part III.A.2 for an expla-
nation of why requiring clarifying questions may remedy the latter problem.
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interrogations.18 9 Importantly, there is no reason to believe that
merely knowing how to invoke their rights will somehow increase sus-
pects' desire to do so. The only real change would be that those who
wish to invoke their rights would now know how. This result better
protects suspects' ongoing right to remain silent and would probably
result in more invocations (and thus the necessitated conclusion of
more interrogations). However, the increase would be attributable to
those who want and intend to invoke their rights-those who would
have otherwise used ambiguous language or conduct in their attempt
to invoke their rights but now know better. Additional invocations
from this group are not results we should seek to avoid, as "[t]he
Miranda decision represents the viewpoint that the suspect's choice to
remain silent . . . is not an evil to be avoided but an acceptable
option."190
Additionally, a statement explaining when silence can and cannot
be used against a suspect at trial could be added to the current warn-
ings. Such a warning would make explicit Miranda's implicit prom-
ise' 91 and ensure that suspects fully understand the consequences of
their decision to speak or remain silent both pre- and post-waiver.
These two supplemental warnings would more accurately reflect mod-
em Supreme Court holdings, thus furthering the Miranda Court's
goal of fully apprising the suspect of his right to remain silent and
ensuring his ability to use it throughout the interrogation process, 92
without negatively affecting interrogators' ability to do their jobs. A
fuller and more precise warning stands to benefit all participants of
our criminal justice system. Most importantly, it benefits the individu-
als by striking a new balance between the modern, sophisticated law
enforcement system and the public at large. "Simultaneously, an
189 See supra Part III.A.3 for an explanation of why requiring the presence of an
attorney in the interrogation room would produce this result.
190 Strauss, supra note 12, at 824; see Croxall, supra note 186, at 1041 ("The very
purpose of the Miranda warnings is to apprise the suspect of his rights. Arguing that
it is a negative that more persons will invoke their rights if clearer warnings are given
seems to suggest that 'hiding the ball' is a good thing and that we, as a society, do not
want people to exercise their protective rights. This cannot be true."). In fact, it may
also be that more complete warnings will result in more suspects agreeing to speak to
police, at least initially, as suspects would be reassured that they could later invoke
without penalty. See Duke, supra note 173, at 558 ("We must also consider the possi-
bility that the warnings actually induce some suspects to talk rather than to remain
silent. The warnings implicitly suggest to the suspect that the police are respectful of
the suspect's rights, that the police are not only law-abiding, but that they are also fair
and objective.").
191 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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unambiguous ... warning furthers the interests of law enforcement,
for administrating such a warning will ensure admissibility of
confessions."19 3
Thus, more complete warnings would benefit suspects by includ-
ing the information they need to make an informed assessment of
their ongoing desire to speak or remain silent. Additional warnings
would also bolster the presumption that post-warning statements are
voluntarily made, because the suspect knew how to protect his rights
and of the consequences of speaking versus remaining silent. All soci-
ety stands to lose are convictions based on incriminating evidence
derived from failed invocation attempts and confessions that occur
after a suspect would have invoked his right to remain silent if he had
known how to do so.
IV. THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION: AMENDING THE WARNINGS
"'It is not admissible to do a great right by doing a little wrong ....
It is not sufficient to do justice by obtaining a proper result
by irregular or improper means."'94
Perhaps it was once true that there was "nothing deceptive or
prejudicial to the defendant in the Miranda warning [s]," 1 9 5 but that is
simply no longer the case. Though the warnings inform suspects of
the existence of their right to remain silent, the value of such knowl-
edge is severely undermined by the warnings' failure to provide gui-
dance on how to invoke the right.196 In other words, the current
193 Boxer, supra note 186, at 445. There is reason to believe that more compre-
hensive warnings would protect all individuals-both the innocent and the guilty. See
Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic
Analysis of the Fifih Amendment Privilege, 114 HARv. L. REV. 430, 451-74 (2000). But see
Stephanos Bibas, The Right to Remain Silent Helps Only the Guilty, 88 IOWA L. REV. 421,
428 (2003) ("Seidmann and Stein's claim is that the right induces guilty suspects to
remain silent, because they know thatjuries will not infer guilt from silence (though
police will). Without a right to remain silent, they claim, guilty suspects would con-
coct (credible) false alibis, leading juries to discount innocent suspects' alibis.. . . The
argument ... supposes that guilty suspects care most about maximizing their chances
of winning at trial, when in fact trials are rare and guilty suspects know it.").
194 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447 (1966) (quoting Lord Sankey, then Lord
Chancellor of England).
195 Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 621 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
196 See Weisselberg, supra note 53, at 1592 (arguing that "[als a prophylactic
device to protect suspects' privilege against self-incrimination, . . . Miranda is largely
dead" because it "sometimes locates warnings and waivers within the heart of a highly
structured interrogation process, provides admonitions that many suspects do not
understand, and appears not to afford many suspects a meaningful way to assert their Fifth
Amendment rights") (emphasis added).
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warnings, even if completely understood, leave a gap in the suspect's
knowledge sufficient to render it implausible to say that he has acted
"with a full understanding of his .. . rights."1 9 7 This treatment of sus-
pects is unfair and, in truth, represents a societal failure.'98 As cur-
rently formulated, the warnings no longer "bear[ ] . . . resemblance to
the 'fully effective' prophylaxis . . . Miranda requires."199 Justice
Sotomayor acknowledged this problem in her dissent in Berghuis and
noted that police are unlikely to provide the guidance necessary to
ensure that suspects actually know how to invoke their rights. 200
Indeed, there is no reason to rely on police to spontaneously and gen-
erously provide such guidance out of their own concern for suspects'
constitutional rights. The time has come to amend the warnings; it is
time to turn Miranda right side up again.20 ' A simple update in light
of Supreme Court decisions regarding waivers and invocations, along
with a statement about the use of silence in court, would better inform
suspects of their rights and ensure that confessions occur as the prod-
uct of free choice, not as the result of confusion, ignorance, or trick-
ery.20 2 Having reached this conclusion, the amendments' content
must be addressed.
This Note is by no means the first to call for modifications to the
Miranda warnings. 203 However, previously suggested amendments do
not address the post-waiver invocation problems this Note identi-
fies.2 04 Thus, previous suggestions might inadvertently exacerbate this
197 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2271 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis added).
198 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 480 ("'The quality of a nation's civilization can be largely
measured by the methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal law."' (quoting
Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 I-IARv. L. REiv. 1, 26
(1956))).
199 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2273 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see
also Anthony J. Franze, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Miranda and the Supreme Court's
2009-10 Term, HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. ONLINE, http://hlpronline.com/2010/09/
death-by-a-thousand-cuts-miranda-and-the-supreme-court's-2009-10-term/ (Septem-
ber 24, 2010) ("[A]lthough the Court has not overturned Miranda, it has whittled
away at the decision bit by bit, transforming a bold effort to protect suspects' constitu-
tional rights into a hollow ritual.").
200 See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2276 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
201 See id. at 2278 ("Today's decision turns Miranda upside down.").
202 Cf Godsey, supra note 38, at 820 ("[A] substantial modification of the warn-
ings is presently called for to bring them in line with contemporary law and
understanding.").
203 See, e.g., id.; Strauss, supra note 12, at 823.
204 See supra Part II. For example, Professors Godsey and Strauss addressed the
current warnings' failure "to inform the suspect that if [he] invokes his right to
remain silent no adverse inferences will be drawn" and argued that this failure results
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particular problem. For example, Professor Godsey has suggested the
addition of the following warning:
If you choose to talk, you may change your mind and remain silent
at any time. If you choose to remain silent, on the other hand, you
will not be penalized in any way.... [Y]our silence will not be used
against you as evidence to suggest that you committed a crime sim-
ply because you refused to speak.205
Similarly, Professor Strauss suggests adding: "If you decide to . . .
stay quiet, that choice will not be used against you in any way."206
These warnings would further confuse-or, worse, mislead-suspects
regarding the impact of post-waiver silence, as each indicates that
merely remaining silent will result in no penalty. This, however, is not
the case; post-waiver silence can be used in court against the sus-
pect.2 07 Further, these warnings provide no guidance whatsoever on
how to invoke the right to remain silent. Professor Strauss's suggested
warning-"You have the right to remain silent and you may state at
any time that you don't wish to talk to us during the interrogation and
we will stop asking you questions"208-comes much closer to provid-
ing such guidance, but even it does not apprise the suspect of the
need for clarity. As such, it too could result in attempted invocations
being ignored.209 Because this Note directly addresses the unambigu-
ous invocation requirement210 and the use of post-waiver silence at
in a tentativeness about invoking one's rights. Strauss, supra note 12, at 807. How-
ever, in light of more recent Supreme Court holdings, such as Berghuis, it is even
more important to inform the suspect of how he must invoke his right to remain
silent-and thus find himself in the scenario in which his silence will result in no
adverse consequences.
205 Godsey, supra note 38, at 818.
206 Strauss, supra note 12, at 823.
207 See supra Part II.C.
208 See Strauss, supra note 12, at 823.
209 For the dangers of such a result, see supra Part II.B. For a more cynical and
humorous, but intentionally unrealistic, suggested modification of the warnings, see
Susan R. Klein, No Time for Silence, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1337, 1345 (2003) ("[W]e are
going to continuously harass you, short of behavior a court might later find shocking,
until you talk to us, but your attorney may be able to get some of your statements
excluded, at least until cross-examination of your testimony and the government's
rebuttal case . . . .").
210 While this concern has been addressed elsewhere, even the solution proposed
there was problematic. See The Supreme Court, 2009 Term-Leading Cases, 124 HARv. L.
REV. 179, 194 (2010) (noting that the Berghuis decision "may require a change the
Court did not consider"-namely, "amending the Miranda warnings themselves to
more accurately inform suspects of their rights"). There, the suggestion was to add
"[I]f you do not wish to answer any questions, you may ask that questioning cease at
any time" to the required warnings. Id. at 198. There are two problems with this
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trial, the warnings suggested here necessarily look very different from
these previously suggested modifications.
To ensure that suspects understand how to invoke their right to
remain silent post-waiver, a warning should be added to provide spe-
cific guidance regarding the unambiguous invocation requirement.
Several variations could undoubtedly serve this purpose, but the warn-
ing should at least include the following information: "After you have
waived your right to remain silent, you retain the ability to invoke it-
and end the interrogation-at any time. However, to do so, you must
state your desire in clear and unambiguous language." Such a warn-
ing would cover the basic requirements of the current invocation pro-
cess and ensure that suspects who desire to invoke their rights will
have the requisite knowledge to do so. And, unlike the use of clarify-
ing questions, which might seem like advice regarding the wisdom of
reassessing one's prior waiver, the additional information provided in
this warning would merely ensure that a suspect could act on a reas-
sessment he has already made on his own.
Additionally, because suspects are unlikely to understand that
their post-waiver silence can in fact be used against them,21" or that an
invocation of the right to remain silent cannot be so used,212 a warn-
ing should be added to clearly inform suspects of the circumstances
under which post-waiver silence can and cannot be used against them
in court. Such a warning should convey the following information:
"After waiving your right to remain silent, anything you say, and even
your silence, can be used against you in court. However, an invoca-
tion of your right to remain silent cannot be used against you in any
manner." This information would both inform and empower sus-
pects, as the knowledge that one's invocation cannot be used at his
addition. First, it indicates that the suspect must "ask" for the questioning to stop and
thus fails to communicate the degree to which the suspect controls the interrogation.
In short, it implies that the suspect needs the interrogators' permission to end the
interrogation, when in fact he may unilaterally end the interrogation of his own
accord. Second, it fails to address the required specificity. In fact, it encourages the
suspect to phrase his attempt in the form of a question, which may introduce ambigu-
ity and render it entirely ineffective.
211 See supra Part II.C.
212 See Strauss, supra note 12, at 807 ("Suspects are never told (or at least are not
required to be told) that their refusal to talk cannot be used against them in a court
of law."); Godsey, supra note 38, at 818 (expressing concern over the fact that the
"implicit promise" of Miranda-that silence will not be used against suspects in
court-is not truly, at least "from the perspective of most suspects, 'implicit' in the
warnings" and calling for a clear statement that no penalty will attach to a suspect's
decision to invoke his right to remain silent).
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trial will allay his fear of invoking213 and make him more comfortable
asserting his rights. Thus, the suspect may confidently invoke his right
whenever he pleases by unambiguously expressing his desire to do so.
Combined, these two suggested warnings would inform the sus-
pect that he must use clear language if he wants to invoke his right,
that there may be negative consequences of merely remaining silent
post-waiver (i.e., without invoking), and that invocations of the right
to remain silent cannot carry negative consequences. With these mod-
ifications, the Miranda warnings might resemble the following:
"You have the right to remain silent. You also have the right to an
attorney. If you cannot afford one, one will be appointed to you at no
expense. If you waive these rights, anything you say, and even your
silence, can be used against you in a court of law. You may invoke
either right and end the interrogation at any time, but you must
clearly and unambiguously express your desire to do so. Such an invo-
cation cannot be used against you in court."
CONCLUSION
The Miranda Court sought to protect suspects' "continuous
opportunity" to exercise the right to remain silent.214 The Supreme
Court's recent decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins has significantly cur-
tailed this opportunity by creating a situation in which suspects do not
know how to invoke the right to remain silent post-waiver. Further,
because of the Court's unambiguous invocation requirement, interro-
gators may ignore a suspect's common sense attempts to rely on this
right.2 15 Worse, such attempts may be used against the suspect at trial,
allowing the jury to infer a guilty conscience, and even guilt, from
attempts themselves. This result does indeed "turn [ ] Miranda upside
down."216 However, this is largely so because the Court did not seize
its opportunity to update the required warnings and bring them in
line with its new requirements. Thus, simple warnings should be
added to better inform suspects of their continuing rights, how to
invoke them post-waiver, and the consequences both of remaining
silent and choosing to invoke. Such amendments would return the
213 See Strauss, supra note 12, at 808 ("[S]ome individuals might be tentative in
requesting their rights out of fear that this assertion will actually harm them or be
construed in an adverse manner.").
214 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
215 For example, neither remaining silent nor expressing a desire to remain silent
in-according to a fairly pro-prosecution standard-"ambiguous" terms will count as
an invocation, and yet both seem to be common sense attempts at an invocation.
216 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2278 (2010) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
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warnings to the fair-trial principles on which they were based 217 by
ensuring that those who have reassessed the circumstances and no
longer wish to speak to police will know how to do so effectively.
217 Id.
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